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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
Case No. 19345 
WILMA HALL, 
P lai nti ff, 
vs. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH, CITY CAB 
COMPANY, STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
and SECOND INJURY FUND, 
Defendants. 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a review of the proceedings before the IndustriJ'. 
Commission of Utah culminating in an Order by the Cornrn1ss1,oc. 
denying additional Workman's Compensation benefits to the Plaintift 
Wilma Hall. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
AND DISPOSITION BELOW 
On March 9, 1981, the Plaintiff was involved in an i'!Utomr,c,1ic 
accident during the course of her employment with the Del'''''" 
City Cab Company. Plaintiff sustained injuries to her rwc,, 
back and other parts of her body. The Plaintiff was 62 years 
,f ~'1" as of the date of the accident. The Plaintiff has weighed 
"''l-,r::iximately 275 lbs. for most of her life (Record p. 28). She 
11os been under a doctor
0
s care for this and other problems relating 
to her heart for some 20 years (Record p. 30). She has been 
Jtven various diets by treating physicians all her life with 
m1n1mal success (Record p. 38). In spite of her weight problem, 
she was remarkably active--working regularly, bowling in three 
leagues, hunting, fishing and doing her own shopping and housekeeping 
1 Record, p. 27). Although the medic'll panel gave her 20% pennanent 
partial pre-existing impairment for her degenerative arthritis 
0f the entire spine, she had no problems with pain in her neck 
er back prior to the accident and had never seen a doctor for 
neck or back problems prior to the accident (Record p. 29). 
\</ithin a very short period following the accident she gained 
even more weight so that she now weighs in the vicinity of 400 lbs., 
1lthough this cannot be verified because the doctors
0 
scales 
~o not go over 350 lbs. (Record p. 27). As of the date of the 
he1r1ng on November 22, 1982, she had not been released by a 
'lnrt::ir to return to work (Record p. 35). 
Since the accident, she has had continuous pain in her 
e ·v 'nd low back, loss of strength in her arms and legs, difficulty 
'1,jl,11ng objects, problems walking, falling episodes to the point 
2 
she has resorted to a wheel chair, which she qaue up 'Jrtl, 
she could not afford to make the rental payments (Rec0r,J f•['· 2-l, 
The em p 1 o ye r pa i d medic a 1 expense s an ,j temp" r ., r ·/ r_ 
disability benefits to September 15, 1981, and permanent_ n~r·_ 1 . 
disability benefits for 10% of the whole person. 
applied for additional benefits and the matter was duly schedule: 
for hearing and subsequently referred to a medicd """~l • 
evaluation. The medical panel found she had a 10% imµ1irne·. 
due to the industrial inJury. They founcl she had ~ pr~-ex1st1 
impairment due to degenerative arthritis of the spine er_111j 
to 20%. They did not distinguish or break down this ftJ"r" 
as between the cervical, thoracic or lumbar spine, thougb Jl 
were affected. They found she had a pre-ex1st1nq i.mp.JtrT,e:,-
due to hypertensive cardiovascular disease equal tci 5%. T'• 
also found she had an impairment equal to 30% due to her hypothyr<JJ,il'.:c, 
and obesity. The medical panel then "found" that: "The incJustrl 
accident did not result. in permanent incapacity subst_a.nt11l' 
greater then (sic) the applicant would have incurreJ h~l 
not had the pre-existing capacity (sic)." 
The administrative law Judge aclopted the fi nd1nqs ,1[ ,_,,-
medical panel as his own, over the objections oft.he Pl3ir1t1f~. 
and entered an order denying additional benefits. 
Review was filed and the Commission uphel•l the lec1~1 
law judge. 
3 
'Jl'l1nt1ff mri.ri~ ,-1 m0t10n f0r referral to the Department 
i'·!h,-1\11. 11 tdt1on f0r determ1n:::it1on as to whether or not the 
"nt.1 ff '"'"'s ,, candidcite for trair1ing for any other job skills 
r ·.,,,·-is, in fact, unemployable du~ to her ;::i.dvanced age, prior 
··•~~. JOb skills and physical impairments. This motion 
~·,-1~ i::;) rlenied.. 
The Utah Legislature in its 1981 session amended §35-1-69 
such a manner thcit its application would make the additional 
-,·,.,·;.lr 1 111n(lat0ry . It did not tak2 eff=ect, however, until approximately 
•. ,,,· .,,-,~•hs after the date Plaintiff's accident occurred. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks an Order of this Court directing a reversal 
•.rie denial of benefits, the awar::l of appropriate benefits 
'r··m the Second InJury Funrl, and referral to the Department 
f Renabili•ation for determination of the Plaintiff's employability 
,., I •C1DH"ity for retraining, and if then appropriate, for an 
~~-1rJ of rermanent t0tal d1s~b1l1ty. 
4 
POINT I 
ARGUMENT 
THE COMMISSION ERRED IN ITS HOLDI',IG THAT T 1!f 
ACCIDENT DID NOT RESULT IN PERMA'.lE'.IT INCl\PA-_'fTlf:s 
SUBSTANTIALLY GREATER THAN THE APPLICA'.'!T \IGIJL1' 
HAVE INCURRED HAD SHE NOT HAD THE PRE-EXISfI~.; 
INCAPACITIES. 
On March 9, 1981, relevant parts of §35-1-69, l]•_;il1 ~,, 
Annotated (1953 as amended) read as follows: 
If any employee who has pre"iously inc11rr.,;1l 
a permanent incapacity by accidental 1nJury, 
disease, or congenital causes, sustA1ns 
an industrial in Jury f-:ir which compens4t i.~n 
and medical care is prO''~cjeJ by t}11s title 
that results in permanent incapacity which 
is substantially greater than he woulcl h3ve 
incurred if he had not had the pre-existing 
incapacity, compensation and merl1cal c~rP, 
shall be awarded on the has1s nf 
the combined injuries, but the liah1l1•y 
of the employer for such compensation "in l 
medical care shall be for the industrial 
inJury only and the remainder shall he fl·1t•i 
out of the special fund provided for rn 
section 35-1-68(1) hereinafter referre; 
to as the "special fund." 
This Court has clearly established by Judicial inten,re_,'l" 
the meaning of §35-1-69 as it existed on March 9, 19Rl. Jc 
the case of Intermountain Smelting C0rpor"l..1:.ion v. r:,-1nlt_1-
610 P2.d 334, (Utah 1980), this Court hel·l the •"mDl v,- 0 r '-' 
responsible only for the perrent-.age 0f cnmpF?ns;:i.ti0n in,J ~i..::> 1 L 
care which the industricil injury bears to the .1ppl ,,-·,nt '" 1 " 1 
disability. The arJministrat1ve law judge in the Inst- 1r.t 
cites the Crtpitano case, but dist1ng11ishes it 1:in th~· h-1·; 1 
s 
- +-_ N 1 ~1 _, l r l '-=' s l :: ".:a p 1 t l no h .} rl ;3. n l n t. er- re 1 at lo n ship . I n hi 5 
Furt:-ier;rirJre, the Ajm1111str--1t1·1e Law ,Judge 
is in~w~re 0f 3ny Supreme Court case that 
11:.is rc::1uir 01 l the pa'jmrc,nt :of Second Injury 
F Jn·l henef1ts f-:ir pre-'=x1sting conditions 
·..;t1ere the rre-ex1st1nci C'0nd1tions have been 
1Jnrel,1ter3 t0 th'? 1ndustr1al accident. 
Jc, •he case '.:Jf K1nchel0e "· Coca Cola Bottling Company 
,,,Jon, 656 P.2'4 440, (Utah 1982), this Court cited the Capitano 
15-_' in,J t:.hen r1uoted from the adr,i1:11strac.ive law judge's reasoning 
,r1 i,1'1(_:tP--?l,=ie os f0llows: 
F·~rthermore, the subsequent in]ury of February 12, 
1980 in which the Applicant sustained a 
hernii:lted disc an the left side of L5-Sl 
is unrelated to the prior injury. 
p s,-,mp ,,r-~ument, in effect, is set forth here. The Court upheld 
p (')1nmiss1nn ir. denying bnnefits in that case but on different 
n, ,n·ls e'1tirel/, and in the course of their reasoning at Page 442 
tht> P, 2J Reporter 5ti1ted 35 follows: 
Un11er t:he rcason;,_ng of :=apitano, the fact 
thi:lt the 1980 Ln;ury i5 unrelated to the 
1974 iniury is not dispnsitive. Irrespective 
Jf an~' causal connect10n, the second injury 
fund ls t.O cr.)fTioensa te one \.Jho sustains "permanent 
inc<pi:lcity which 15 substantially greater 
1-_han he woul(l h~1ue incurred if he had not 
had t~1e pre-exist1n..._1 incapacity." 
'lc>dr t 1 at the 5ta•us of the law as of March 9, 1981, 
'11" the comhined disabilities if substantially greater 
~ t,l_' ,_.rJmpens1hle. 
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In the case of Intermountain Health Care, Inc. v. Grc.ea., 
562 P.2d 617, this Court stated that the term "substantial! 
greater" 
simply means that 
and measurable portion 
of the disability. 
it be some definite 
of the causation 
The case did not require that there be a relationship bet·,eer 
the two. At page 619, this Court stated: 
Consequently, inasmuch as it appears that 
the pre-existing condition increased the 
resulting disability by one third, it follows 
that under the requirements of the statute, 
the medical expenses as well as the compensation 
award should have been apportioned two thirds 
from the employer and one third from the 
specia 1 fund. 
Since the one third considered was 10%, the Court clearly stat.e<1 
that 10% pre-existing condition was substantial. 
The Utah Legislature amended §35-1-69 in its lq81 sess1·,., 
which, although it did not take effect until after this acci Jen·. 
is relevant in ascertaining the status of the law at the ti~e 
of the accident. The amended sections as relevant are as fril!Jwso 
If any employee who has previously incurred 
a permanent incapacity by accidenta 1 in Jury, 
disease or congenital causes, sustains an 
industrial injury for which either compensation 
al'\a or medical care, or both, is provided 
by this title that-resultSin permanent 
incapacity which is substantially greater 
than he would have incurred if he had not 
had the pre-existing incapacity, or which 
aggravates or is aggravated by such pre-existing 
incapacity, compensation al'\a ~medical care, 
whreh mearea~ eafe and other related items 
afe as outlined in §35-1-81, shall be awarded 
7 
•Jn th0 bas1 s •_)f the comh1ned injuries, but 
the l iahi 1 ity nf the Employer fnr such compensation 
aR~ , med1crtl Cdre , and other related items 
shalT be fnr the ~ndustrial injury only 
and the remainder shall be paid out of the 
s~ee±at second inJury fund provided for 
1n §35-1-68(1) ~efe±ftaf~ef feteffeR ~6 as 
"s~eetat ftifte" _:_ 
For purposes of this section, (a) any aggravation 
of a pre existing inJury. Jisease, or congenital 
caus>? shul l be deemed "substantially greater", 
and compensation, medical care, and other 
related items shall be awarded on the basis 
of the combined in ur1es as rovided above; 
pro,1uled, howe"er, tha• .b where there 
is no such aggravation, no award for combined 
iniuries shall be made unless the percentage 
cJf oermanent physical impairment attributable 
to the industrial inr~ry is 10% or greater 
and the percentage of permanent physical 
impairment resulting from all causes and 
conditions, includin the industrial in ur , 
is greater than 20%. e.a. 
r· LS cle"lr by the fact that the Legislature added, in 
• 11P first paracirnph above, the words "or which aggravates or 
ls ~'1 1 rava.ted by such pre-ex1st1ng incapacity, ."that they 
-1ns1derPd the interpretations of the prior law by this Court 
:leerly state that the pre-existing condition did not need 
'.'J ~qari'l'nte or be aggra,,atecl by the industrial injury but merely 
• 11e resultant combined disab1l1ty be "substantially greater" 
- " ·,r.1cl i ha•1e been <che result but_ fur the pre-existing incapacity. 
):',1rr•1er, by way of restr1ct1nn, not by way of expansion 
-1,,, l:iw, the second paragraph sets forth the threshhold that 
i1~ ·?ffect1'1e date of the law, pre-existing conditions 
f l<..:'1 I t I •1 :it nnt dire2tly aggravated by the 
8 
industrial injury would not be compensated for unless the 1 r1,1,1~u 1 -. 
injury itself resulted in at least a 10% permanent phy~ 1 '"· 
impairment and the combined impairment is greater thiln 2Jt. 
Thus, the Legislature clearly understood the Ortega, Caa1tanc 
and Kincheloe decisions of this Court consistent with Pla1nt1ff', 
interpretation above. 
With these preliminary concepts, it is now a simple ma':tec 
to apply the law as it existed on March 9, 1981, to thP '.a,ct' 
of the present case. 
A. THE DEGENERATIVE ARTHRITIS OF THE SPINE RESl!LTElJ I"; 
SUBSTANTIALLY GREATER INCAPACITY. 
The medical panel found the degenerative arthr1t1s •Jf •n<-
spine to constitute a pre-existing impairment equivalent t0 
20% of the whole person. Under the reasoning of the admin1str~t1"e 
law judge, the pre-existing condition would have to be relat•J 
in some way to the injuries sustained in the industrial accident. 
In the Medical Panel Report at page 303 of the Record, x-ra\-< 
of the spine were reviewed and the following impressions noted: 
Impression: Early degenerative changes 
in the lower cervical spine. 
Impression: Degenerative disc disease of 
the thoraco-lumbar spine as described abo"e. 
The medical panel then concluded on page 9 of its report (?P' 
P· 304), that applicant suffered permanent partial imra1rmer-
9 
r .::is 1J 1 t the r-Jegenerat1ve arthritis of the spine in an 
1:"nunt r1f 2()% of the whole person. 
There was no breakdown by the medical panel as to what 
rarr lf the spine resulted 1n what part of that 20%. The Plaintiff 
nolC11ned of pain in both her neck and low back subsequent 
r-'l the accident. It would, therefore, be presumed that the 
!:s1h1l1ty must relate to those two areas. 
On page 9 of the Medical Report (Record, p. 304), the medical 
')'J.11P l stated: 
(6) It is possible that had she 
not had degenerative cervical arthritis 
of her spine the symptoms in her neck at 
the time of her accident would have been 
considerably less, would not have been so 
prolonged and would not have rendered any 
permanent physical impairment. This would 
be ctnt1cipated 
8'Jt then, t!1e medical panel adds: 
but is speculative. 
lf r• is t'J be anticipated, then the speculation comes on the 
,; le> if denial, not on the side of acceptance. This Court has 
•·-~rly stated on numerous occas1ons that doubts as to coverage 
'11 11 l :1e resnlved in fauor of the employee (Jones v. California 
"'-~ , 2 4 4 P . 2 d 6 4 0 , ( U t a h 1 9 5 2 ) . In the Jones case, this 
• 1 t St 3 ter}: 
This court has repeatedly held that the 
Wor'<man's Compensation Act should be liberally 
~onstrued to effectuate its purposes, and 
where there is doubt, it should be resolved 
10 
in favor of coverage of the employee. 
[citations omitted] 
The medical panel goes on and in the f0llow1ng µ.r~, 
states: 
Except for the cervical area there 
is no relationship between the industrial 
accident and the other medical problems 
and physical impairment that she has 
and again in the following paragraph: 
Except for the cervical area there is nu 
relationship between the industrial accident 
and the other medical problems and physical 
impairment that she has. 
Thus, the medical panel has effectively found and st~ted _ 
three separate statements on the same page under the same nurnher 0 c 
paragraph (6), in three separate subparagraphs of that ·l1·nsh1, 
that there is a relationship between the industrial 1cc1Jec 
and the pre-existing problems of the cervical spine. 
The administrative law judge concluded at pase 
Findings of Fact (Record p. 316): 
Had the applicant not had her pre-existing 
problems, the medical panel speculated that 
she may not have sustained any permanent 
physical impairment as a result of her industrial 
accident. Because of the pre-existing problems, 
at least to a substantial extent, the applicant 
does now have a 10% residual impair~ent 
in her cervical area [e.a.] 
The error the administrative law judge makes .cit this -,," 
that the medical panel found pre-existing conditions ,( 
of the spine, part of which was obviously rel,itin13 to the ·1?r"1,·1 
1 l 
J11e t') the rjegener.:::i.t1ve arthritis. The 10% awarded by 
1- \11'°:''11,..,,3.l punt?l is clearly irjent1fied and based on the severe 
- 1 ree •Jf f1bros1t1s and the d1ff1culty she has in that function. 
This is sumro~rized out of Dr. D1turi 1 s evaluation 
,, I is ·:lecJrly the basis 0n which the medical panel awarded 
·~·e 1 J% ~r1s1ng out of the industrial accident. There is definitely 
' pre-ex1st1ng arthr1t1c 1cond1t1on of the spine which directly 
rel1tes to the soft tissue in]ury sustained in the accident. 
'Jnder the cases of Ortega, supra p. 7, Capitano, supra p. 5, 
1n1j Ktncheloe, supra p. 6, however, there does not have to be 
r<:::-1 J.. t Lr)nsh ip. It canno':. be said, particularly in light of 
•.h'? figures in Ortega, that 20% pre-existing impairment is not 
sJbsta.nt1al. It is also clea::- fr·0m Ortega, that 10% arising 
"t' )f thc> acc1.Jc>nt is substantial. The 20% combined with the 
•n thr•:iugh the Combined Values Chart of the Guides to Evaluation 
c Pe>rm1nent Imoair!nent, American Medical Association, Chicago, 
I I I 1no1s, -attached hereto as Aopendix A, would result in 28% 
KP.TB.nP.!lt unp31 r11lt2!lt. If this in t~rn, without any other consideration, 
'<1sl1t~·l d1rc>ctly 1 nc-:i cl1sab1l1ty, she would be entitled to 
1Y~ '·1 1dJ1~ion t.o what was awardeO. 
8. THE HYPERTENSIVE CARDIOVASCULAR DISEASE RESULTED IN 
SUBSTANTIALLY GREATER INCAPACITY. 
T'1e rne.J ic 1 1 panel fcound the Plaintiff had a disability 
, , is 1 r~sul t •)f »ypertens 1 •;e ccird io"ascular disease. Cardiovascular 
12 
disease affects the entire function of the body. It 'Nr)\l l, J 
difficult to understand how the disability of the cardi0•,as<'ul,· 
system did not relate to any subsequent inJuries or impa1r:ne11ts. 
But again, under Ortega, Capitano and Kincheloe, it is not nP 0 ess;c 
that there be a relationship between the two impair:nents; mer~~ 
that the resultant disability is substantially greater. T~· 
medical panel found that she had 5% pre-existing lmp.11r1',er.: 
due to her cardiovascular disease absent all other considerations 
The pre-existing 5% combined with 10% from the accident accorJ 
to the Combined Values Chart, attached as Appendix A, woul·'. 
result in a total impairment of 14%. Thus, there would be oc, 
increase of 9%. The Ortega case dealt with 10% and 20%. The 
question then becomes: Is 14% substantially greater than 10% 0 
It is noted in the case of Northwest Carriers Inc. "· Industrial 
Commission-Ingersoll v. Camp, 639 P2.d 138 (Utah 1981)--ChPr• 
were actually two cases heard together by the Court--th1s Courl 
approved the combining of a 3% pre-existing impair:nent w1th 
a 65% industrial impairment for purposes of dividing responsibil1t•· 
between the Second In]ury Fund and the industrial c3rr1er 
It is clear then, and dictated by logic, that 4% is a substantial 
increase in physical impairment. 
C. THE HYPOTHYROIDISM AND OBESITY RESULTED IN SUBSTA1'ITJidt 
GREATER INCAPACITY. 
The medical panel found Mrs. Hall 30% disable•] for lier 
1 3 
,1,µ,~i·y. They do not identify this as concurrent, but suggest 
1 • • be pre-existing; howe,,er, under paragraph 5 of the Medical 
"H,el Report, they state: "Previously existing and concurrent 
1,1-,;s1<>ll impairment is 47%." [e.a.] (Record, p.304). Since 
there is no question as to the hypertensive cardiovascular disease 
an,J the degenera'::ive arthritis ,c;f the spine pre-existing, the 
c)nly crincurrent "disability" would be a portion of the obesity. 
In any event, the obesity constitutes 30% disability which the 
~,e<J1ca l panel finds, by implication of its inclusion, to be 
permanent. There should be no question that her weight "problem" 
is permanent. The only question could be as to whether or not 
the excess weight is permanent. 
!w0 and one-half years. 
It has now been with her for 
If the total obesity problem were to be ignored, the remaining 
lisabilities found by the Panel to pre-exist the accident total 
5)% ,,fter CtdJustment by the American Medical Association's Guides 
t•1 Evcilllation to Permanent Imp;iirment, Combined Values Chart, 
Appendix !\. If this 32%, which includes the unquestioned pre-existing 
.mpa1rment for cardiovascular disease and degenerative arthritis, 
,,,,I the l r)% from the accident is combined with the 30% for the 
-,-,e31t'/, part of which is ob•riously pre-existing, under the 
,mC>inej Values Chart, the total obesity increases her total 
"rr111rment by 20%. If the 10% found in Ortega is substantial, 
1 •"'n t 11 e 2 0 % in the instant case must also be substantial. It 
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is clear under the Ortega, Capitano and Kinchelne ~cises 
at least the pre-existing weight problem is rompens1hl'? 
It seems incredible to argue that an obesity problem their ti> 
been in existence for 62 years is not permanent. 
D. THE COMBINED EFFECTS OF ARTHRITIC SPINE, HYPERTENSIVE 
CARDIOVASCULAR DISEASE, HYPOTHYROIDISM AND OBESIT' 
RESULTED IN SUBSTANTIALLY GREATER INCAPACITY. 
It is elementary logic that if each of the elements 
disability pre-existing discussed in Points I A, B, and C abu"e, 
are substantially greater, the combined whole and effect c' 
the whole is substantially greater. The more appropriate •iuestl )C, 
perhaps, relates to the total overall effect of the comb1ne1 
pre-existing conditions. 
For purposes of argument, we take the 20% pre-ex1st1·1J 
degenerative arthritis of the spine, combine it with •he '·' 
hypertensive cardiovascular disease, we have 24%. If we assJr.•_ 
that one-half of the 30% obesity related to pre-existin•J oc•I 
one-half is concurrent, this combines with the 24% for 35% pre-existrn; 
impairment. Thus, she would be a 65% person as of the )J· 0 
of the accident. As a 65% person, she was functiona 1. By ctdd 1 Ii 
10% from the accident for cervical in]ury, combined values r 
42% and at 42% she was a 58% person. As a 58% person sh•' 
not function. The re a 1 it y of the s i tu at ion i s that , b .i s •'·I 
her inability to function and her lack of activity imrJ•1seJ 
15 
l r1 jury, 
5 I%. l 
she lost an add1t1onal 15%, bringing her total disability 
Very few 62 year old workers could be retrained to 
'cJr1ct1 )n in the compet1t1ve ]Ob market with only 48% or 49% 
The adm1n1strat1ve law Judge states the relationship between 
:.:;e ,~cr~ 1 1cal lnJ 1Jry and pre-existing cervical problem is "speculative." 
Tc1e 'Tiedi 1~ci1 panel stated the relationship would be expected 
b·Jt thPn raised the question of ''specul3.tion." I am compelled 
CPre •o express a problem which has arisen with a number of 
re3ularly used medical panel members. It is not speculation 
·,n1id1 causes the medical panel to shy away from a conclusion 
C·f "substantially greater" effect. Bue. rather, a basic disagreement 
c~d rhilosophy of the panels frequently expressed outside the 
~anel reports and reflected by their reports, between the panel 
;c.J the law itself 3S interpreted by this Court and promulgated 
"Y the Legislature. It involves a self-assumed responsibility 
'n •he pctrt of the panel members to protect the Second Injury 
f.rn•J from the effects of this Court's decisions and the dictates 
: :: +-_ 11 t_' Le 'l 1 s l ,J. t ·Jr e. It has been more recently reflected within 
tn~ p~nel reports by f ind1ngs of 9% disability in cases where 
.~1 s c1dve previously granted the st3ndard 10%, thus avoiding 
·~\ _"J'nb1ning the 30% in two halves, we lose 1%. Thus, it appears 
·tip '1<" 1lic.1l Pilnel treilted the entire 30% for obesity as pre-existing 
irr1·!\nq .1t their 52%. 
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the threshhold set forth in ~35-1-69, Utah Code AnnotiltPd 'I':'',. 
as amended) . The obvious effect of the 9% disab1 lity r3t ic:", 
as well as the panel's repetitious findings in the present cas.: 
of "no greater effect" is to avoid the interaction w1 th pre-existn: 
impairments and the mandatory compensation from the Second In;c: 
Fund for the disability resulting therefrom. 
Mrs. Hall was working prior to the accident. She hus c,:: 
worked since. She was active prior to the accident: bawl1n3, 
hunting, fishing, shopping, doing all her own housework. Sh• 
does not now accomplish any of these things with the except1:: 
of minimal shopping and minimal housekeeping. 
accident, Mrs. Hall could walk without fear of falling; she 
cannot now. She was relegated to a wheelchair, which she cc. 
turn gave up only because she could not afford the rental pnyments.' 
No one has raised any questions as to Mrs. Hall's "erac1t« 
and yet her testimony has been totally ignored. The Conun1ss1or, 
does not have the right "to disbelieve or disregard uncontr1J i•:te.J, 
competent, credible evidence, as it appears to have Jone here." 
(Jones v. California Packing, supra p. 10). 
No effort was made to evaluate Mrs. Hall psycholog1c'lll/ 
to determine if her symptoms are real to her in fact. The mP·I t .. 
panel and the administrative law judge seemed tu ac,.,,,,, 
2 Mrs. Hall has now been able to purchase a used whee[,·hdir 
her own and is again utilizing it. 
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,,r,·.·ity, her symptoms, cind her clisability; and yet conclude 
:'1oit her rrobl ems are no worse than if she had been a 100% person 
: 1 ef0r~ the accident. One hundred percent persons are not forced 
from the JOb market by ci 10% disability. Mrs. Hall has been 
f Jrced from the JOb market because she was in fact not a 100% 
nerson. This is accepted and confirmed by the medical panel. 
cJL"T II THE COMMISSION ERRED Bl ITS HOLDING THAT 
CONCURRENT OBESITY DID NOT RELATE TO THE 
ACCIDENT 
A substantii'll increase in weight occurred within the first 
fo•ir months of her inactivity following the accident (Record p. 27). 
!\!though she has had the weight problem throughout her life, 
she h3.s maintained her weight in the area of 275 lbs. and has 
cever, prior to the ace ident, reached the approximation of 400 lbs. 
"Jr .. !\llen MacF3.rlane's letter dated February 11, 1983, included 
1n •he Record at pages 284-285, was not made available to the 
0101nc1ff along with the Medical Panel Report. The third paragraph 
s1,·1ws a ,jefinite misunderstanding by Dr. MacFarlane of the facts 
r~~~~1nq to her weight when he st~tes: 
At one time, in recent years, she 
was able to get her weight down to as low 
as 275 pounds but since the accident of 
March 1981 it has been ur to more than 
400 pounds. 
,,,., .Jnrtor obviously believes she weighed well over 275 lbs. prior 
t •1Ls accident, whereas 275 lbs. was an average weight for 
1 i3 
most of Mrs. Hall's life. 
The doctor concludes on his second page (Record p. 29~ 
that her obesity is not due to inactivity imposed by the acc1rie-
but rather due to overindulgence in caloric intake. 
nothing in the record to support Dr. MacFarlane' s qrn.tu1t,;1 
conclusion. Although there is nothing in the record relat1·.-
to overindulgence in caloric intake, the doctor states it w~u!· 
be "a simple matter for her to readjust her caloric intak~ tJ 
compensate for the lowered physical e1ctivity There ""' 
been no investigation or evaluation by the panel t.o determ1np 
if excess caloric intake is in fact the problem, and no psychologL-•. 
evaluation to determine if the opplicant is capable of adJust1rJ 
her caloric intake if such would help. 
The fact of the matter is that hypothyroid obesity is s1~p: 
obesity due to hypothyroidism. One of the principal characteristic' 
of hypothyroidism is a decrease in the basal metabolic rate. 
It is most common in women. The basal metabolic rate, in turn. 
is the minimal energy required to be expended for the "maintenance 
of respiration, circulation, peristalsis, muscle tonus, 00.1 
temperature, glandular activity, and the other veget-1t1ve funcc1•;ns 
of the body. " (See Dorland's Illustrated Medical Dict1nnar 
W.B. Saunders, Philadelphia, PA.). 
In the present case, we have taken a woman with ,, r·~· 
energy requirement to maintain the "at rest" functions Jt "-
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,J/ :In,] put her at rest. The Commission has then argued that 
,!thJUgh her daily activities are nri longer burning up what 
.s •!ready a reduced cal0ric intake and on which she is already 
.becse, the forced inactivity does not relate to the weight problem 
ri'=''_-:=i.11se she can st1l l eat lf?ss. 
~y father told me of an old horse he had which he broke 
:Jf u1e habit ")f eating entirely by gradually reducing its daily 
r3ti---in of hay. The problem was, Dad complained, that the horse 
.,r-,.jual ly reached a point where it "refused" to work for him 
1nl shor•ly after he had completely weaned the horse from hay, 
the darned thing up and died on him. have often thought, 
if the horse had been burdened with human thought processes 
anJ emotions the experiment would have turned out different. 
w1 lrna H'll l is burdened with such human "advantages," and if 
a life-time of medically supervised efforts to reduce her weight 
ltd nrit succeed while she was maintaining a relatively high 
,ct 1·•ity level, we would have to abandon our own mental advantages 
t•) -nnc 1 ude her condition now is not permanent. Dr. MacFarlane's 
'tn·ol 1st ic solution of "let her eat less" smacks loudly of a 
•,icJ I-known historical quip. 3 Now, as then, it provides no answer. 
Even if diet could be established as a solution to the 
cc:;s obesity, she still had the obesity problem prior to the 
'Lt"t tl1Pm eat cake" 
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accident. It was the obesity "problem" that resulce<J in ,,, 
excess weight gain. The problem itself pre-existed. The effc 
only is cone urrent and then only in part bee a use she was a. l r~c·J·,· 
obese prior to the accident. 
POINT III THE COMMISSION ERRED IN DENYING Plaintiff's 
M:Jl'ICN FOR REFERRAL TO THE DIVISICN OF REHABILITl\TION 
FOR EVALUATION AS TO EMPLOYABILITY 
Section 35-1-67 Utah Code Annotated, as amended, prov1.Jec 
for referral to the Division of Vocational Rehabilitation an' 
states: 
. If and when the division of vocational 
rehabilitation under the state board of 
education certifies to the industrial cormiission 
of Utah and in writing that such employee 
has fully co-operated with the division 
of vocational rehabilitation in its efforts 
to rehabilitate him, and in the opinion 
of the division the employee may not be 
rehabilitated, then the commission shall 
order that there shall be paid to such employee 
weekly benefits out of that special 
fund provided for by section 35-1-68(1), 
for such period of time beginning with the 
time that the payments (as in this section 
provided) to be made by the employer or 
its insurance carrier terminate and ending 
with the death of the employee. 4 
In the reality of the situation, Mrs. Hall is only> 48% 
woman, and under the facts is entitled to a tentative f1nd1no 
4since March 9, 1981, certain minor amendments have been TI«,., 
to this section and to the language quoted above but w1tlrn•1' 
changing the effect of the quoted language. 
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ici·I l rc~ferra l ':'J the Department of Rehabilitation for evaluation 
t·J determine if she can be retrained at her age and with her 
impairments to function in any occupation. I don't think there 
ts any doubt in anyone's mind that such an evaluation would 
cJnclucle she is not retrainable by virtue of her age, past education, 
~Jrk histor; and impairments and that she is, in fact, unemployable. 
If the record could sustain a finding that her excess weight 
since the accident results from overindulgent caloric intake 
1nd that she was psychologically and emotionally able to control 
that intake and, therefore, that her excess weight is not permanent, 
she is still unemployable in the competitive job market due 
to her other pre-existing disabilities combined with the 10% 
found by the medical panel to relate to the industrial injury. 
This Court clearly found in the case of Northwest Carriers 
v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 639 P.2d 138 (Utah 1981), 
that nonphysical factors are to be considered by the Division 
•1f Rehabilitation in evaluating the employability or unemployability 
1f the employee. The Court made reference to the Industrial 
~ommiss10n' s distinction between impairment and disability as 
a,Ju!'ted by the Guides for Evaluation of Permanent Impairment, 
supra p. ?, and on page 141 of the P.2d Reporter stated: 
Factors extrensic to an industrial injury, 
such as age, mental abilities, prior training, 
and job market, are appropriate factors 
in determining an injured employee's earning 
power and degree of disability. 
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Further, on the same page, this Court stated: 
In workman's compensation law, 
is an 11 impairment of earning 
[citations omitted] 
a d1sab1l1ty 
capacity." 
It is clear the Division of Rehabil1tatuJn will rel/ '.L 
more than the intrinsic factors of the industrial inJury 
the circumstances of the instant case even if all of the pre-ex1st1' 
impairments were ignored for purposes of rletermining the impci1 rmen· 
resulting from the industrial accident, t3k1ng into effert tc,c 
age, mental abilities, prior training, physical c,1pac1c:.1"'s, 
and the job market of this particular Plaintiff, the 10% constitites 
such an impairment to the earning capacity of Mrs. Hall th3• 
she is permanently and totally disabled. 
There is still another consideration, however. \>/1th t \.,..., 
pre-existing weight problem, cardiovascular disease and arthr1•, 
spine disease, combined with the injuries sustained with th1' 
a cc id en t , the increased ob es i t y s inc e the a cc id en t , "''!"' n 
not permanent as Dr. MacFarlane claims, still causes her 
be temporarily totally disabled until it can be controllc1 
As of this date, no viable medical treatment has been offere,; 
her, and is, in fact, denied her by the medic<'il panel to ass;'' 
her in accomplishing that purpose. She is entitled to tempor•r 
t o ta 1 d i s ab i 1 i t y at 1 ea s t u n t i 1 a v a 1 i rJ e f f o r t h a s t> e e ,., ·c • 
to reduce her weight and a determination made follow1nq 
medical effort as to whether or not the weight is perm,1t•"'''' 
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.;~p '1uctezuma v. the Industri3l Commission of Arizona, 509 
2cl 227 (Arizona 1973).S 
CONCLilSIOtl 
r• is clear the Commiss1on erred in concluding there was 
no relat1onship between the pre-existing arthritic condition 
and the cervical inJury resulting from the accident. It is 
11s0 cle1r the Commission erred in its conclusions that there 
•c1s nu relationship between •he pre-existing cardiovascular 
l1se1se and the obesity problem and the accident itself. The 
Commission also erred in its conclusion that there must be a 
relationship between the pre-existing impairment and the impairment 
resulting from the industrial accident. It is clear that under 
'he Ortega, Capitano and Kincheloe cases, Mrs. Hall's resultant 
incapcicity was substantially greater than without the pre-existing 
Jnd1t1ons. It is also clear that the Commission erred in denying 
l'liiintiff's motion for referral to the Department of Rehabilitation 
for evaluation as to employability. 
finder the law 3S it existed on March 9, 1981, the Plaintiff 
enti•led to additional compensation and to evalu:;tion to 
lPtPrmine tf she is, in fact, employable in any occupation. 
"l,Jctezuma, temporary total disab1lty was finally terminated 
·fr"'r various attempts and a finding and conclusion that the 
'"fll''fee> ·w.1s not ,,ooper:'lt1ng with the doctors and was repeatedly 
1nl~t1ng her rliet. 
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DATED this 28th day of November I ')8 
Respectfullly Submitted, 
Jay Meservy 
At orney for Plaintiff Wilma Hall 
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COMBINED VALUES CHART 
These combined values are based on the formula: A%+ 8% (1000~ - AO...\ =combined value ot A% 
and 8% I where A% and 8% are written as decimals). The guides to the chart are percents ranging from 
1 to 100 punted down the side of the page and across the bottom. To combtne any two values locate 
the larger of the two on the side of the page and read along that row until you come to the column 
mdu:ated by the second value at the boMom of the page. At the intersection of this row and column is 
printed the combmed value. For example, to combine 35~ and 2D°ro read down the side of the page 
until you come to the larger value, 35%. Then read across the row you have located until you come to 
the column indicated by 20% at the bottom of the page At the 1ntersect1or. of this row and column is 
the number 48. We say that 350,,, and 20"1t> combine to 489,;,. Due to the construc11on of this chart, the 
Larger value must be read at the side of the page. 
If three or more values are to be combined, select any two and find their combined value as above. 
Take thts combined value and the third value and find their combined value This process car be 
repeated 1ndefrn1tely with the value obtained rn each case being the comb1nat1on of all the prev•ous 
values. 
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